Asian Values Revisited

As expected, after the news report that judges may be given discretion when it comes to capital sentencing (Death Sentence? Let Judge Decide), the national press has set up a poll and published three letters, one that welcomed the change, one that was neutral and one that was dismissive of the move. The importance of studying the negative response is to follow the arguments of relativism, and the notion of human rights, and it is here I will publish snippets of Lim's letter.

First, 'human rights' encompasses a broad umbrella of rights. Even 'cruel and inhuman' is imprecise as a standard - is it measured relative to the evil the perpetrator committed, or against how a member of civilised society should be treated?

More broadly, which single society, or eclectic characteristics of a sample of societies, should be used to define human rights? It is a loose concept and more care is needed in defining the basis and scope of the alleged breach.

The argument that international human rights need to be respected ignores the fact that the values underlying these rights are heavily influenced by the ideals of victorious Western powers following World War II, rather than a global consensus.

More importantly, it says nothing of the efficacy of this proposed move in favour of 'human rights' in relation to the costs to public safety and crime deterrence.

In one sense, Lim isn't wrong when he says that the advocation of human rights has been most aggressively promoted by Western powers. However, he also misses the point that the international declaration of human rights was agreed by several other communities, none of which are Western and belong to other indigenous and Asian societies (edited: a controversial element is mentioned in the comments. I don't think it necessarily demolishes my argument but thats up to the reader to decide). If that is the case, human rights are not at all the sole possession and creation of a single society, but as it should be, a global consensus on the treatment of individual life and liberty. It is not any different from the global consensus on the global warming, hence the need for the Kyoto Protocol (which Singapore, Australia and the United States has yet to ratify).

Regarding the costs of crime deterrence and public safety, let me address that point further down.

Second, the focus on discretion in mandatory death sentences misses the crucial point that statutory calibration has been made within the Penal Code to reflect any extenuating circumstances, thereby reducing the offence to one of culpable homicide.

Further, the distinct provisions reflect society's calibrated response, according to how heinous a killing was. Allowing a convicted murderer to serve the same sentence as another who committed a less blameworthy crime unjustifiably conflates the two.

If, following a conviction, the outcome proves unjust nonetheless, the Penal Code provides for clemency via a presidential pardon.

Therefore it is hard to see how Mr Rajah's proposal provides a less 'cruel and inhuman' alternative simply because that decision is rendered judicially.

A weak argument is one that says, "there's already an avenue to address the problem. And that's enough." That's how social problems get pushed under the carpet because the masses are led to think that particular avenue is adequate in resolving the concern. In this case, one should be critical and intelligent to point out that this so-called "statutory calibration" is not a failsafe mechanism. Many times, clemency has been consistently denied and not to mention the entire procedure is a harbouring, grueling, tedious and painful process. Indeed, the argument goes both ways, let's concede that Lim is right about both routes (whether it is a clemency plea or a discretionary judgment) being identifical, that it becomes instantly obvious the latter is a more efficient, less time-consuming and, one might argue, a more formally powerful statement. It means that even despite due considerations, the judge has no other alternatives but to deliver a death sentence.

There is nothing to suggest that by retaining the mandatory death sentence, Singapore 'will be left out in the cold' as Prof Hor suggests. On the contrary, countries like the United States and Britain which have traditionally championed 'human rights' have considered or adopted anti-terrorism legislation similar to our Internal Security Act, which has also often been described as a breach of 'human rights'.

Draconian policies on road pricing and chewing gum have been similarly considered or adopted because they have proven effective.

In an age where Western-style 'human rights' has given rise to uncontrollable classroom behaviour in Britain and schoolyard murders in the US, the argument for harsher measures can only be stronger, not weaker.

(...)

Ultimately, the worth of any policy must lie in its effectiveness. Singapore's safe environment remains the envy of the world - arguably due to its tough stand on civil and criminal wrongs.

Those who seek legislative change must show convincingly why such a change is desirable, and how the benefits outweigh the costs.

Here is the backbone of Lim's stance. There are two central points he is making here. One is that even in Western countries, like the United States, not every legislation is motivated by "human rights" causes, and sometimes are subversive of them as well. He then juxtaposes the existence of "human rights" as the cause for social harms, such as school shootings andunruly classroom behaviour (quite an absurb statement, but one I will contemplate seriously...for now). The second is, as followed up by the notion of crime deterrence and public safety, legislations must be effective to deliver these results.

Although it is true that no country can be said to be represent a perfect embodiment of fulfilling all the clauses of the international human rights act, it is a mistaken to assume this means it should be an acceptable behaviour to be welcomed by the population. Many Americans are contesting the PATRIOT ACT (and its successors), which should be the core moral lesson that citizens should not accept dubious reasons for state coercion and violence just because the state concocts an imaginery fear that it is for their own good. We already have our own Internal Security Act, which Singaporeans have a good idea how it is truly used, and while some choose to accept that as an inevitable trade-off for security, the discretion for death penalty is nowhere in the same category. In other words, if we choose to enforce state violence, we should be more thorough and conscious of the consequences.

Draconian measures may be effective but there is also the moral imperative a society should consider. It is rather one thing to suggest that a ban on chewing gum weighs the same accord as hanging a man/woman, and another to suggest that the effectiveness of one draconian measure ensures another's guarantee for success. To be clear, all empirical work so far has shown that capital punishment has never been an effective deterrent, and nobody has produced results to the contrary. Singapore's death penalty has never undergone independent research and so far, every argument that purports to demonstrate its effectiveness has been regurgitated by those who accept haphazardly the rhetoric from the state government. Even for those who defend the death penalty rigorously, a moral message has been absent, or it's a moral message of fear.

Which leads to my hypothesis that the national press, and all other institutions supportive of dominant orthodox, has never ever, in the least bit, considered other alternatives, that can be less punitive than death penalty. Arguments about decriminalization (as shocking as some find it) or prisoner-exchange legislations, misconceptions about drug harm, gaps in the current legislation about what constitutes "drug trafficking", all these issues still get shoved off the debate, as not even worthy of entering the scope of discussion. That's how the debate will continue to be manufactured, and that's why any discussion on the death penalty continues to be shallow and supportive of governmental doctrine.

Though Lim is carefully not to advance the bugbear "Asian values", he is still revisiting the same currents that were the foundation of the term. I don't plan to buttress an entire argument here against the term, but rather to say that no doubt, some degree of relativity can be accepted but it is important to bear in mind, societies have the capacity to reach objective standards of justice and ethics. In another letter (Relook sentences), Low stresses that a crucial characteristic of Singaporean society is to "inculcate a more civil and caring society." Rhetoric is fine, everyone is all for the building of a more civil and caring society, the question is who should be pursuing our interests in this case? What some higher authority purportedly says, or our own inner moral convinctions? Because if it is the latter, that will mean a more careful investigation and consideration of what they are and how we choose to exercise them.